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1. Introduction
Every researcher who seeks to understand AI programs by running them should be
familiar with this book. Since all but the most theoretical understanding of AI systems
depends on watching them in action, Cohen’s book is important in helping AI become an
empirical science. AI is young, but so are many fully established sciences: Turing’s paper
on machine intelligence is older than Crick and Watson’s on DNA, for example. AI has
several methodological advantages over other young sciences. For example, as computers
are deterministic, our experiments are in theory completely reproducible (although those
who have attempted to reproduce other people’s results know how difficult this can be
in practice). As another example, since we are masters of our machines, we often have
complete control over input parameters. Given maturity, there is every reason to suppose
that research in AI could be a showcase for the very best experimental practice to be found.
However, we have a very long way to go before we get to this point, and are well behind
many other subjects of a similar age. More books like Cohen’s are needed if we are to catch
up and achieve these dreams.
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2. Empirical versus Experimental
What is the difference between empirical and experimental methods? Paul Cohen neatly
and accurately summarizes much of the difference with the slogan,
Empirical= Exploratory+ Experimental
Exploratory techniques allow us to visualize, summarize and construct models of system
performance. Experimental techniques then test the models formed during the exploratory
phase of research using confirmatory methods like statistical hypothesis testing. Whilst
Empirical Methods for Artificial Intelligence clearly differentiates between the two tech-
niques, and is very strong on experimental methods, it is not as strong on exploratory
techniques. There are reasons why this is not surprising.
First, much of the creativity in research goes into the exploratory phase. The
experimental phase is often just confirming or refuting an inspired guess from the
exploratory phase. Of course, the experimental phase can also involve creativity. For
example, interpreting a negative experimental result might require inventing an ingenious
new model. However, if the exploratory phase is done well, the experimental phase will
just rubber-stamp the informal observations made during the exploratory phase. As the
exploratory phase involves creativity, and creativity is a notoriously difficult subject to
understand or teach, it is not surprising that a book on empirical methods focuses much of
its attention on experimental methods.
A second reason for the focus on experimental methods is that the exploratory phase
of research is much less reported. Scientific journals concentrate on the experimental
confirmation of results. They present an accurate and concise summary of the results, and
not a blow-by-blow account of how the results were stumbled upon. To compound matters,
there is a strong and, in many cases, desirable tendency to present results in a sanitised
manner with all the dead-ends and negative results removed. The exploratory phase is thus
very under-reported. As a consequence, reading journals will teach you little about how to
do research. Whilst a few reports exist of the exploratory phase of a research project, they
are the exception rather than the norm.
The exploratory phase of a research project is motivated by one or more scientific
questions. Cohen writes (pp. 3–4),
“Studying AI systems is not very different from studying moderately intelligent an-
imals such as rats. . . . Whether your subject is a rat or a computer program, the task
of science is the same, to provide theories to answer three basic research questions:
• How will a change in the agent’s structure affect its behavior given a task and
an environment?
• How will a change in an agent’s task affect its behavior in a particular
environment?
• How will a change in an agent’s environment affects its behavior on a particular
task?”
Many would feel that Cohen is being a little unfair to rats. Putting this objection aside,
Cohen’s categorization focuses on constructing theories to model change in an agent’s
behaviour. This ignores the fact that AI has a strong performance slant, a bias that can
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be traced right back to Turing. For example, in natural language research we might
develop a theory that answers questions like, “How capable is the agent at a particular
task (for example, understanding news-wire stories)?” Whatever the number of basic
research questions, the goal remains a theory that can model some aspect of the agent’s
behaviour.
3. Experimental design
The value of Cohen’s discussion of experimental design can be illustrated by the topics
he covers in the chapter devoted to it. If you are already familiar with experimental controls,
extraneous variables, ceiling effects, regression effects, order effects, sampling bias,
dependent variables, pilot experiments, and factorial experiments, you should probably
consult Cohen to find new insights to guide your future research. If not, you should
definitely consult the book. One of the most straightforward of these is sampling bias, but
AI is far from immune to the problem: any paper which has ever reported only examples
its new technique worked on is guilty of this. To take a less well-known issue, what are
ceiling effects and why do they matter? Ceiling effects occur when a small difference
between two techniques is due to them both performing at near the best performance that
can be achieved. The failure to notice a ceiling effect can lead to years of research being
devoted to inferior techniques.
Whilst Cohen is very good at telling us good practice in all these areas, he has a little
less to say about the man traps that it is easy to fall into. We are experts in this field, having
repeatedly fallen into many of these traps [3]. For example, one of the maxims of [3] is
“Do look at the raw data”. Summaries of data inevitably present an approximate view. By
looking at the raw data, you can often spot trends, and interesting odd cases which are
hidden in the summaries. Doing so, we could not miss the worst-case problem as it took
350,163,776 branches to solve in a region where the median was to search a single branch
[5]. We had conspicuously failed to see this effect at smaller problem sizes, even though it
was very obvious in the raw data files. Not only that, when one experimental run had not
finished overnight, we killed the job and deleted the file, but were lucky that the effect was
common enough to reoccur the next day. We believe that it is very important to document
such man traps to help others from falling into them.
Cohen writes that outliers are “in the data for a reason, and we don’t know what it
is, so we delude ourselves by ignoring it. Our representation of reality, then, has two
parts: a smooth trend and a memo to ourselves to figure out what caused the extreme
value”. Outliers such as the one we found are rather more important than deserving of
a memo. In practice it is vital to have strategies for mitigating their effect on run times,
and for researchers they help us appreciate the pathologies that can disrupt search. This
illustrates the one personal disappointment of this book for us. It does not discuss at all
the particular problems inherent in empirical study of search. This is an area in which
current practice is typically lamentably weak, and in which an empirical science would be
especially valuable [6]. All too often there is no scientific hypothesis under test, or at most
that “Algorithm A is better than Algorithm B”. It is frustrating not to receive direct advice
to improve the situation.
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The disappointment of not seeing our own field analysed is minor. Cohen discusses
many of the vital issues in other contexts, and we still recommend this book heartily
to researchers into search. We can all learn from Cohen’s discussion on the purposes of
experiments (p. 100). He contrasts imaginary dialogues asking researchers why they are
doing experiments. The algorithms researcher gives the reply ‘I thought it would be worth
learning which is faster’, at best testing the hypothesis about algorithms A and B. By
contrast, the deep reason for research on identical or non-identical twins is that ‘the role of
genetics in behavior is one of the great unresolved questions’. All our experiments should
link as directly with important questions. If not, then as Cohen asks, what are they for?
4. Statistical analysis
Empirical Methods for Artificial Intelligence is very strong on statistical methods
for analysing your data. This is especially valuable, because most disciplines which
feed researchers into AI, except perhaps Psychology, do not give their graduates a
strong grounding in the use of statistics in empirical science. Cohen’s book is not an
introduction to statistical methods, but you will find here many useful techniques well
beyond those that you once took in Statistics 101. Of particular note is the coverage
of computer intensive methods [2]. Cohen’s book is directly responsible for our own
use of bootstrap methods when we wished to show the superiority of a new technique
which showed only a small improvement on one that was already state of the art
[4]. These methods seem ideal for studying AI systems because they are very robust
if you have (as we often do in AI) large samples, and because they do not require
knowledge about the sampling distribution and the underlying population from which
data are drawn. The exponential nature of search in AI often means that statistical
assumptions are not even reasonably correct, invalidating many standard tests. Sadly
bootstrap methods are not widely used in AI, and it can only be hoped that Cohen’s
book will help to remedy this situation. A Common Lisp package, CLASP, is available
from Cohen’s laboratory, http://eksl-www.cs.umass.edu/research/clip-
clasp-overview.html, although Common Lisp’s dubious portability prevented us
from using it.
Statistics, of course, never prove anything. They only fail to disprove some hypothesis.
But our question about the role of statistics goes deeper than this. In some areas of science
like medicine, sample sizes may be fundamentally limited. We may therefore resort to
statistics to improve confidence in a result. In an area like AI, however, we can often take
very large samples. Why then do we need any statistics? Cohen’s book is good on this
point.
“For parameter estimation, sample sizes should be as large as you can afford; for
hypothesis testing, sample sizes should be no larger than required to show an effect.
The previous comment suggests that samples can be ‘too big’ for hypothesis testing,
and indeed they can.” pp. 137–138 (our emphasis)
The problem is that by increasing the sample size, we can discover statistically
significant but completely meaningless effects. Our ability in AI to run experiments on
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large samples may therefore trap us into identifying essentially meaningless differences.
This is one reason why all of us may need the sort of statistical tools described in Cohen’s
book.
5. The role of models
Statistical tools test some model of a system’s behaviour. Cohen is highly and rightly
critical of the lack of models in AI. In a survey of 150 papers from the Eighth National
Conference on Artificial Intelligence [1], only eight described models sufficiently detailed
to predict or explain the system’s behaviour. This is worrying as a good model summarizes
the essential aspects and interactions in a system, thereby identifying assumptions and
factors to test in the experimental phase. Why are detailed models so rarely used in AI?
Cohen blames in part the crude results given by worst-case analyses. But this cannot alone
be the cause. Part of the blame is the emphasis in AI on performance. If we are only
interested in meeting some performance target, then we may be tempted to believe that
models are a luxury we can do without. Ultimately, the debate may become one of whether
AI will achieve its aims as a science or as engineering.
Cohen promotes statistical modelling methods, particularly linear regression, to build
predictive, even causal models of system behaviour. This is something we too wish to
encourage. Systems are often much too large and messy to build exact analytical models.
Even if we can build an exact model, it might be too difficult to solve (other than by running
the system and seeing the behaviour). This does not mean, however, that we should give
up modelling our systems completely. We can take a cue from chemistry, where abstract
models are constructed on simplifying but ultimately false premises. For example, we
might assume that electrons are confined to strict orbits around the nucleus as this leads
to good predictions about chemical behaviour within the periodic table. In studying large
and complex AI systems, we can build models that depend upon similar ungrounded and
potentially false assumptions.
6. Conclusions
In a moment of concern that he has done his job too well, Paul Cohen writes (p. 101) that
“Technologies and the cultures that adopt them encourage behaviors; sports cars encourage
fast driving; . . . and books like this one encourage well designed experiments, which, if one
isn’t careful, can be utterly vacuous”. This is a problem that AI would love to have. If it
ever happens, AI will have more to thank this book for than to blame it for. Our own
recent experience suggests that we still have a long way to go. At the ECAI-98 workshop
on Empirical AI, it gradually became clear that the person most knowledgeable about
empirical research was the local psychology major acting as student volunteer.
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